政协原常委孙怀山被双开,进口扭矩传感器,啤酒鸭的制作方法
1.0 Introduction简介
20世纪世界运输史上发生了两个重要的变化,即飞机和高速铁路的运营(Fischer and Kamerschen,2003)。与邻国日本和西方发达国家相比,中国的高速铁路起步较晚,但发展速度很快(Liu and Kuang,2010)。据2014年底统计,全国铁路总里程已超过11万公里,高速铁路总里程已超过1.5万公里(张、杨、卫,2009)。高速铁路在短途客运市场上具有航空运输所不具备的独特优势。许多短途航线,由于高铁的开通,航空的时间优势已经不复存在,客运量已经下降甚至停飞(wei,2007)。中国高速铁路的快速发展将使运输市场的竞争更加激烈。在中短途市场上,高速铁路以其与航空运输一样快的速度、不断改进的服务和固有的准时性,对民航业产生了巨大的影响。面对如此强大的竞争对手,中国各大航空公司需要依靠自身独特的飞行优势、成熟的运营机制、积极的市场开拓、稳定的业务来源、以及应对挑战的定价策略。本文以中国南方航空公司为例,探讨如何运用博弈论制定价格策略,使其价格能够吸引消费者,保证其合理收益。本文首先回顾了博弈论的相关文献,然后介绍了如何计算高铁与飞机的均衡价格,然后分析了南航应如何根据计算结果制定价格策略。
Two important changes have taken place in the history of world transportation in the 20th century, namely the operation of aircraft and high-speed railways (Fischer and Kamerschen, 2003). Compared with neighboring Japan and developed countries in the West, China's high-speed railways started late, but its development speed is rapid (Liu and Kuang, 2010). According to statistics at the end of 2014, the total mileage of the national railway has exceeded 110,000 kilometers, and the total mileage of high-speed railway has exceeded 15,000 kilometers (Zhang, Yang and Wei, 2009). High-speed railways have a unique advantage that air transport does not have in the short-haul passenger transport market. Many short-haul air routes, because of the opening of high-speed rail, the time advantage of aviation no longer exists, the passenger load has dropped or even grounded (Wei, 2007). The rapid development of China's high-speed railways will make the competition in the transportation market more intense. In the short- and medium-haul market, high-speed railways have a great impact on civil aviation by virtue of the speed which is as fast as that of air transportation, continuous improvement of services and inherent punctuality. Faced with such a strong competitor, China's major airlines need to rely on their unique flight advantages, mature operating mechanisms, active market development, stable business sources, and pricing strategies to meet the challenges. The aim of this essay is to take China Southern Airlines as an example to explore how to use game theory to formulate a price strategy so that its price can attract consumers and guarantee its reasonable income. This paper first reviews the relevant literature of game theory, then introduces how to calculate the equilibrium price of high-speed rail and aircraft, and then analyzes how the Southern Airlines should formulate a price strategy based on the calculation results.
2.0 Main body主体
2.1 China Southern Airlines南航
南航总部设在广州,成立于1995年3月25日(中国南方航空,2018年)。是中国运输机数量最多、航线网络最发达、客运量最大的航空公司。数据显示,近10年来,南航机票价格涨幅不到1%(中国南航,2018年)。在中国年平均通胀率超过8%的背景下,这表明中国南方航空公司始终利用低成本竞争参与市场竞争。其中一个主要原因是中国高铁的崛起。一方面,高铁继续采用低价手段抢占南航市场份额,南航不得不频频打折。随着人力和运营成本的不断提高,南航的利润空间越来越小。对于南航来说,了解价格战的根本原因,合理定价,摆脱恶性价格竞争,对于南航的健康发展具有重要意义。
China Southern Airlines was headquartered in Guangzhou and established on March 25, 1995 (China Southern, 2018). It is the airline with the largest number of transport aircraft, the most developed route network and the largest passenger traffic in China. The data shows that the price of air tickets of China Southern Airlines has risen by less than 1% in the past 10 years (China Southern, 2018). In the context of China's annual average inflation rate of more than 8%, it shows that China Southern Airlines always uses low-cost competition to participate in market competition. One of the main reasons for that is the rise of China's high-speed rail. On the one hand, high-speed rail continues to use low-cost methods to seize the market share of China Southern Airlines, and Southern Airlines has to make frequent discounts. With the continuous improvement of manpower and operating costs, the profit margin of China Southern Airlines is getting smaller and smaller. For China Southern Airlines, understanding the essential reasons for price wars, determining a properly price, and getting rid of vicious price competitions are of great significance to the healthy development of China Southern Airlines.
2.2 Game theory
In a game, based on whether the participants can negotiate freely before taking any action, and whether the mutually beneficial action plan or strategy can reach a binding agreement, a game can be divided into cooperative game and non-cooperative game (Nash, 1951). A reasonable and predictable feature of a cooperative game is that it is Pareto optimal: if a different strategy can be used to simultaneously improve the situation of two participants, they will definitely agree to do that (Sehipper, Nijkamp and Rietveld, 2007). However, in reality, competitors in many cases find it difficult to reach a binding agreement, so the solution in the competition in this case cannot reach the Pareto optimality, but only the Pareto suboptimal (Hsu, Lee and Liao, 2001). One of the most typical examples is the prisoner's dilemma often studied. A study of the prisoner's dilemma found that oligopolists often struggled with a prisoner's dilemma when deciding their pricing strategy (Netessine and Shumsky, 2005). They must decide whether to take aggressive pricing to gain a larger market share at the expense of competitors' losses, or to adopt a more moderate pricing strategy to coexist with competitors in the current state of their respective market share and obtain higher profits than when competition is fierce (Anjos, Cheng and Currie, 2004). This is the inevitable result of a non-cooperative game. In a non-cooperative game, to accurately predict the behavior of rational participants in a game, it needs to introduce a concept of “Nash Equilibrium”, which refers to that in non-cooperative game strategies, in the case where other people do not change their strategies, the strategy of all players is the best for themselves. At the Nash (1951) equilibrium point, every player in the game has no motivation to change their strategy alone. Cooperative game refers to a binding agreement between players, such as price alliances between oligopolistic companies, etc. (Nash, 1951).
2.3 The price game between high-speed rail and aviation industry in China
Aviation industry
Unchanged fare fare reduction
High-speed rail Unchanged price 5 10 -10 15
Price reduction 15 -5 -5 -5
Table 1 Simulation of price game of China Southern Airlines with China's high-speed rail Shao (2015)
The following is a game that simulates the price strategy of aviation and high-speed rail according to game theory.
If high-speed rail reduces price and aviation industry keeps the price unchanged, then high-speed rail will profit 15, aviation industry will lose 5, the overall profit will be 10; if both high-speed rail and aviation industry keep the price unchanged, then high-speed rail will profit 5 and aviation industry will profit 10, the overall profit will be 15; if high-speed rail keeps the price unchanged, and aviation industry reduces price, then high-speed rail will lose 10 and aviation industry will profit 15, the overall profit will be 5; if both high-speed rail and aviation industry reduce price, then high-speed rail will lose 5 and aviation industry will lose 5 neither, the overall loss will be 10.
For the high-speed rail, the price cut is obviously better than the maintenance. The expected return of the high-speed rail price reduction is 10 (15-5), and the retained income is -5 (5-10). The high-speed rail is for its own maximizing returns will inevitably reduce prices. From the perspective of China Southern Airlines, price cut is also better than maintenance, because the profit of its price cuts are 10 (15-5), the maintenance income is 5 (10-5), and it will most probably choose to cut prices. Or it can be said that this price war will definitely be provoked by high-speed rail, because the price cut will definitely bring higher profits and encroach on the aviation market share, and aviation has to choose to cut prices in order to meet the challenges of high-speed rail. Therefore, both the high-speed rail and the aviation industry have chosen to reduce prices as a strategy. From the perspective of revenue, they lose 5 and the overall loss is 10. The overall benefit at this time is the worst. This is the Nash equilibrium situation pointed out above. When each individual seeks to maximize the benefits, the overall interests are not optimal or even the worst, that is, the non-cooperative game can only reach the Pareto suboptimal. |