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It has been pointed out in earlier studies that FDI spillovers do not appear automatically, but depend on the host countries' absorptive capacity that is largely determined by several factors. A number of papers have tested the absorptive capacity hypothesis. For instance, Blomstrom et al. (1994b) found that FDIs have a stronger positive growth effect in countries with a higher level of development (i.e., when the country is sufficiently rich in terms of per capita income).8 Balasubramanyam et al. (1996) tested the hypothesis of FDI efficiency given the trade policy of the recipient countries. They found that the effect of FDIs on growth was stronger in countries with export promotion policies than in countries that pursued import substitutions. In fact, they found that the growth effect of FDIs in developing countries that followed import substitution policies could not be established. Balasubramanyam et al. (1996) argued that import substitution policies reduced the efficiency of FDIs by distorting the returns from social and private capitals. It has also been argued that the adoption of new technologies requires labor that is able to understand and work with the new technology. On this issue, Borensztein et al. (1998) found that FDI inflows only had a marginal direct effect on growth, but in countries where human capital was above a certain threshold it did positively contribute to growth (i.e., when FDI was interacted with the level of education of a country's labor force). The same interaction effect was not significant in the case of domestic investment, which may reflect the nature of technological differences between FDI and domestic investment. This finding implies that because developed countries have a higher level of human capital, they are more likely to gain from FDIs than developi ng countries. This conjecture is further supported by Xu (2000) who found that technology transfer by U.S. MNCs contributed to the productivity growth in developed countries, but not in developing countries. The development of both banks and stock markets were found to be important pre-conditions for FDI spillovers. According to these authors, a more developed financial system positively contributed to the process of technology diffusion associated with FDI. Although empirical evidence on the link between FDI and growth is mixed, evidence on the role of institutions in the development process is more compelling. North (1990), perhaps today's bestknown economic ‘institutionalist,’ defines institutions as the humanly devised constraints or rules of the game that structure political, economic, and social interaction. As the structure evolves, it shapes the direction of economic change towards growth. In short, institutions affect security of property rights, prevalence of corruption, distorted or extractive policies, and thereby affect the incentive to invest in human and physical capital, and hence economic growth. A number of recent papers empirically confirm the importance of institutions for economic development. These institutional indicators include quality of bureaucracy, property rights, and the political stability of a country. Barro (2000) argues that secure property right improves growth performance by encouraging investments, and also by enhancing the productivity of investments. Meanwhile, Demetriades and Law (2006) find that stronger institutions are more important than financial developments in explaining output per capita in low-income countries. In short, empirical studies on FDI–growth relationship remain limited particularly with respect to the effects of EF on FDI spillovers. Arguably, countries that promote greater freedom of economic activities are more likely to gain from the presence of MNCs. (Reiter & Steensma, 2010) The role of FDI in economic development from a neo-classical economic perspective, FDI from developed countries is deemed an integral ingredient to the economic growth of underdeveloped countries, and economic development is best served when the state plays a limited role in controlling the market (Caves, 1996; Hymer, 1976; Kindleberger & Herrick, 1977; Todaro, 1989; Vernon, 1966). It is argued that developing countries benefit directly from FDI through an inflow of capital, tax revenues, and employment, and indirectly through spillover of the foreign investor’s technology and knowledge to local enterprises and workers, and through access to foreign markets. Domestic suppliers, competitors, distributors, customers, and employees learn from their interaction with foreign investors, and their ability to compete globally is enhanced. It is also argued that the entry of competitive foreign enterprises takes the competitive structure of the industry to a new level. Local firms that survive in this increasingly competitive environment do so only by becoming more efficient and, thus, more competitive, raising the productivity of the local industry and, in turn, the economic growth rate of the developing country. Hence, FDI can be an important vehicle for the transfer of technology to certain local firms and for increasing the overall competitiveness of the industry, which will have a positive effect on economic growth (Borensztein et al., 1998). On the other hand, FDI may crowd out local enterprises and actually be detrimental to economic development. Foreign enterprises are often significantly superior to domestic enterprises and either buy out or drive out domestic firms, leading to a concentration of power in the industry (Agosin & Mayer, 2000; Aitken & Harrison, 1999; Blomstro¨m & Kokko, 1996). The net effect is a decrease in competition and domination by foreign entities. Whether this occurs seems to depend on the level maturity of the local markets and the type of sectors that FDI enters. Agosin and Mayer’s (2000) panel study found that the effect of FDI in Asia, and to a lesser extent in Africa, crowded in domestic investment, and, yet, in Latin America, the study found that FDI crowded out domestic investment. Agosin and Mayer (2000) conclude that the effects of FDI are not always positive and that FDI policy plays a role in determining the outcome. With regard to the theory that development occurs in an indirect way as a result of FDI spillovers, the results are mixed as well. Konings’s (2001) firm-level panel-data study of Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland found that there were no positive spillovers to domestic firms, and, in fact, on average, there were negative spillovers in Bulgaria and Romania. He surmises that this negative effect may be because the technology gap was too large in these less advanced countries and the dominant factor was the increased competition of the foreign firms. Glass and Saggi (1998) believe that the larger the technology gap between the host and home country, the lesser the chance of technological transfer. This can occur for two reasons: one, the host country is unable to absorb the technology due to inadequacies in human capital and physical infrastructure or, two, the multinational corporation may not invest in the latest technology in the host country because of its perception of the lack of absorptive capacity. In support of this hypothesis, the Kokko (1994) study of Mexico spillovers found no evidence of spillovers in industries where multinational firms used highly complex technologies. There are clear instances where FDI does contribute to economic growth, but, not always. This suggests that there are other factors that interact with FDI that determine the outcome. Whether FDI has a positive or a negative effect on economic growth depends on such things as the sectors it operates in, the ability of locals to participate and learn for foreign investors, and the ability and willingness of host governments to use FDI with development in mind. Country policy can play a role in strategically positioning FDI for the benefit of the country in terms of economic development. (b) FDI policy’s influence on the FDI-economic development relationship. When multinational corporations enter markets of developing countries, it is often market failures that attract FDI and give them the advantage in the market. Foreign investors anticipate that their superior technology and knowledge entering into a less efficient market with fewer and less capable competitors will give them the opportunity to capture a large percentage of the market. Multinational corporations are interested in profit, not in local accumulation or local industrialization. It is up to the state to redirect multinational corporations’ rationality and oppose them, if necessary, to ensure that local objectives are met (Evans, 1979). The host government has a legitimate seat at the bargaining table with the foreign investor. It can strategically use FDI by controlling investors’ behavior through state policy. In this way, the state plays an important role in shaping the market and creating policy that ensures growth, development, and social equality and that the state is not beholden to foreign interests but can devise an economic strategy that leads to development. Thus, important variables for understanding growth and development in developing countries are the autonomy and strength of the state and the development policies and structure of the political processes (McMillan, 1999). (Durham, 2002) several factors can influence the ‘absorptive capacity’ of host countries to successfully harness FDI toward sustained expansion. Other studies do explicitlyexamine such conditional factors, including the initial level of development (BlomstrJom et al., 1992), existing human capital development (Borensztein et al., 1998), and trade policy( Balasubramanyam |