女排大冠军杯2017,惊艳村官路,湖南春晚 吴昕
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4.2. Improve the board system
As an agent of shareholders in corporate governance, the board of directors shall exercise its business responsibility on behalf of shareholders. As the client of internal management, exercise the responsibility of the owner and entrust the enterprise to the management of the management layer. When the board commissioned managers, not only have to be carefully screened for managers of information, reduce the negative impact of the hidden information and the execution of the contract the behavior of managers to supervise, lower managers later hidden actions and "moral hazard". It can be seen that the board system arrangement has an important influence on the management agent.
4.3. Strengthen board building
As stated earlier, in the enterprise internal control, the board range including contract, supervision, incentives and other corporate governance areas and link, the agent has the important influence to managers. The board should be strengthened to strengthen the board's function, optimize the structure of the board of directors, improve the professional quality of the board members, so as to monitor the behavior of managers and protect the interests of shareholders.
Enhance board functions. Director to set up a decision with the support of regulatory agencies and other measures, to ensure the independence of the board of directors is beneficial to strengthen the function of the board of directors, play the core role of the board of directors in the enterprise internal control, to protect the interests of the shareholders and other interest groups. For non-executive directors, should give full play to its four different roles (strategic role, performance or a supervisory role, risk role, personnel management roles), prompting executive director responsible for the decisions we make and corporate performance has, to ensure that the enterprise has adequate internal control system and risk management system, effective supervision and management agency behavior, in order to protect shareholders' interests. At present, has been set up the audit committee of listed companies, such as price committee, remuneration committee director decision support and regulatory agencies, to strengthen the function of the board of directors, to improve the enterprise internal control system.
Optimize the board structure. The empirical research shows that the size of the board and its composition are two key variables that influence the role of the board. For board size, small scale, the board plays a stronger role; On the contrary, the board of directors plays a weaker role. For the board composition, the proportion of internal directors is high, the board of directors really plays a weak role; On the contrary, the proportion of external directors is higher, and the board of directors can play a better role. You can even set up an internal director, that is, the CEO of the company, and the rest of the board hires outside directors.
Improve the professional quality of board members. Members of the board of directors must have enough professional background, professional quality, supervision ability and judgment, to be able to the enterprise internal and external environment, management, finance, etc for risk identification, risk analysis and risk assessment, and can according to the actual internal and external environment and enterprise development, makes the corresponding strategy, to try to circumvent the enterprise decision-making mistakes.
4.4. Improve the management compensation incentive system
Managers incentive system is one of the main driving force of the development of the enterprise, its purpose is to encourage managers in the process of pursuing its own interests, give full play to the enthusiasm of managers themselves, using their talents and professional skills, the pursuit of enterprise value maximization, maximizing shareholders' equity, to ensure the interests of the investors. Under the modern corporate governance system, the enterprise managers to better resolve principal-agent problems, must pay attention to long-term incentives for enterprise managers, from establishing and perfecting the science of managers incentive system, improve managers' pay structure, establish and improve the management performance evaluation, etc, to perfect the managers compensation incentive system. 6.3.1 establish and improve the scientific management incentive system.
5. Conclusion
Most of scholars in the study of cash holding decisions, would choose to study respectively the financing constraints or agency problems and the relationship between cash holdings, in fact, financing constraints and agency problem is not completely reject, the increase of the agency conflict will increase the degree of enterprise information asymmetry, and make the enterprise faced with more financing constraints. An isolated study of financial constraints or agency issues affecting corporate cash levels can lead to erroneous decisions. For cash holdings decision-making research, therefore, is very necessary to combine financing constraints and agency problems, study the interaction effect on corporate cash holdings and their value effectmay have more practical significances.
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