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WorldCom's efforts to integrate MCI illustrate several areas senior management did not address well. In the first place, Ebbers appeared to be an indifferent executive who "paid scant attention to the details of operations."16; For example, customer service deteriorated. One business customer's service was discontinued incorrectly, and when the customer contacted customer service, he was told he was not a customer. Ultimately, the WorldCom representative told him that if he was a customer, he had called the wrong office because the office he called only handled MCI accounts.17 This poor customer stumbled "across a problem stemming from WorldCom's acquisition binge: For all its talent in buying competitors, the company was not up to the task of merging them. Dozens of conflicting computer systems remained, local systems were repetitive and failed to work together properly, and billing systems were not coordinated."18 Poor integration of acquired companies also resulted in numerous organizational problems. Among them were: 被兼并公司不好的整合也导致了大量的组织问题。其中包括： • Senior management made little effort to develop a cooperative mindset among the various units of WorldCom. • Inter-unit struggles were allowed to undermine the development of a unified service delivery network. • WorldCom closed three important MCI technical service centers that contributed to network maintenance only to open twelve different centers that, in the words of one engineer, were duplicate and inefficient. • Competitive local exchange carriers (Clercs) were another managerial nightmare. WorldCom purchased a large number of these to provide local service. According to one executive, "the WorldCom model was a vast wasteland of Clercs, and all capacity was expensive and very underutilized. There was far too much redundancy, and we paid far too much to get it."19 Regarding financial reporting, WorldCom used a liberal interpretation of accounting rules when preparing financial statements. In an effort to make it appear that profits were increasing, WorldCom would write down in one quarter millions of dollars in assets it acquired while, at the same time, it "included in this charge against earnings the cost of company expenses expected in the future. The result was bigger losses in the current quarter but smaller ones in future quarters, so that its profit picture would seem to be improving."20 The acquisition of MCI gave WorldCom another accounting opportunity. While reducing the book value of some MCI assets by several billion dollars, the company increased the value of "good will," that is, intangible assets-a brand name, for example-by the same amount. This enabled WorldCom each year to charge a smaller amount against earnings by spreading these large expenses over decades rather than years. The net result was WorldCom's ability to cut annual expenses, acknowledge all MCI revenue and boost profits from the acquisition. WorldCom managers also tweaked their assumptions about accounts receivables, the amount of money customers owe the company. For a considerable time period, management chose to ignore credit department lists of customers who had not paid their bills and were unlikely to do so. In this area, managerial assumptions play two important roles in receivables accounting. In the first place, they contribute to the amount of funds reserved to cover bad debts. The lower the assumption of non-collectable bills, the smaller the reserve fund required. The result is higher earnings. Secondly, if a company sells receivables to a third party, which WorldCom did, then the assumptions contribute to the amount or receivables available for sale.21 So long as there were acquisition targets available, the merry-go-round kept turning, and WorldCom could continue these practices. The stock price was high, and accounting practices allowed the company to maximize the financial advantages of the acquisitions while minimizing the negative aspects. WorldCom and Wall Street could ignore the consolidation issues because the new acquisitions allowed management to focus on the behavior so welcome by everyone, the continued rise in the share price. All this was put in jeopardy when, in 2000, the government refused to allow WorldCom's acquisition of Sprint. The denial stopped the carousel, put an end to WorldCom's acquisition-without-consolidation strategy and left management a stark choice between focusing on creating value from the previous acquisitions with the possible loss of share value or trying to find other creative ways to sustain and increase the share price. In July 2002, WorldCom filed for bankruptcy protection after several disclosures regarding accounting irregularities. Among them was the admission of improperly accounting for operating expenses as capital expenses in violation of generally accepted accounting practices (GAAP). WorldCom has admitted to a $9 billion adjustment for the period from 1999 thorough the first quarter of 2002. 2002年7月，有关会计违规几个披露后世通申请破产保护。其中承认不当占经营费用作为资本开支违反一般公认会计准则（GAAP）。世通公司承认从1999年到2002年第一季度期间调整$90亿美元。 1Copyright © 2003 by Dennis Moberg, Santa Clara University and Edward Romar, University ofMassachusetts‐ Boston. Reprinted with permission. This case was made possible by a Hackworth Faculty Research Grant from the Markkula Center for Applied Ethics, Santa Clara University. 2 This is only true if he is liable for the loans he was given by WorldCom. If he avoids those somehow, his net worth may be plus $8.4 million according to the Wall Street Journal (see S. Pulliam & J. Sandberg [2002]. WorldCom Seeks SEC Accord As Report Claims Wider Fraud [November 5], A ‐1). 3 Colvin, G. (2002). Bernie Ebbers' Foolish Faith. Fortune, 146, (11 [November 25]), 52. 4 Padgett, T., & Baughn, A. J. (2002). The Rise and Fall of Bernie Ebbers. Time , 159, (19 [May 12]), 56+. 5 Padgett, T., & Baughn, A. J. (2002). The Rise and Fall of Bernie Ebbers. Time , 159, (19 [May 12]), 56+. 6 Young, S., & Solomon, D. (2002). WorldCom Backs Chief Executive For $340 Million. Wall Street Journal (February 8), B‐1. |
